The Ukrainian army’s 115th Mechanized Brigade in training.
Ukrainian army photo
Six days after breaking through Ukrainian lines west of Avdiivka, Russian brigades and regiments are slowly widening their salient—a five-mile-deep knife wound plunging into Ukrainian territory, its point lodged in the village of Ocheretyne.
The situation is desperate for the exhausted Ukrainian brigades in the area. It’s a foregone conclusion that the Ukrainians will lose a few villages around the Ocheretyne axis.
The real risk, however, is that the Ukrainian Tavriya Operational-Strategic Group—the command responsible for forces west of Adviivka—will have no choice but to cut its losses, retreat a few miles to the west and reconsolidate along a new defensive line threading north to south west of Ocheretyne.
That retreat could surrender tens of square miles of territory and force hundreds of civilians to flee or resign themselves to living under brutal occupation.
Worse, the retreat—if badly executed—would represent an opportunity for the Russians to redouble their local attacks and achieve a second, third or fourth breakthrough that could, like a chain reaction, trigger a wider Ukrainian collapse.
Retreating is extremely risky even when it’s the best option, which is why disciplined armies plan for retrograde action at least as carefully as they plan for offensive action. “Retreats are the most difficult operations for any commander and force,” historian Andrew O. G. Young wrote in Armies in Retreat: Chaos, Cohesion and Consequences.
How the Russians broke the Ukrainian line west of Avdiivka last weekend is the subject of heated debate in Kyiv and across the 600-mile front line of Russia’s 26-month wider war on Ukraine.
Some observers have blamed the Ukrainian army’s 115th Mechanized Brigade, which recently rotated into positions in Ocheretyne—and was immediately overwhelmed by the Russian army’s 30th Motor Rifle Brigade.
Others have pointed out that the 115th Mechanized Brigade is under-equipped and, like all Ukrainian units, starving for ammunition as it awaits fresh supplies from the United States—supplies that were delayed for six months by Russia-friendly Republicans in the U.S. Congress.
It’s worth noting that all Ukrainian brigades struggle to hold defensive positions under relentless bombardment. “The aggressor has an advantage in the air and artillery, delivering almost continuous strikes on the Tavriya OSG positions,” the Ukrainian Center for Defense Strategies reported.
The firepower imbalance might prove decisive as the battle rages on. Sensing an opportunity and apparently feeling confident in their chances, Russian commanders have shoved the 15th and 74th Motor Rifle Brigades into the salient along with elements of the 90th Tank Division and some special forces.
At least seven Ukrainian brigades and a separate battalion are fighting back: the 23rd, 25th, 47th, 100th and 115th Mechanized Brigades, the 25th Air Assault Brigade, the 3rd Assault Brigade and the 425th Assault Battalion. The brigades typically deploy just one battalion at a time.
In all, it’s apparent the Russians have more than 10,000 troops in or near the salient. Just 3,000 or so Ukrainians oppose them, if the Center for Defense Strategies’ estimate is accurate.
Defending is easier than attacking even when the attacker has a firepower advantage, so the Russians aren’t guaranteed to win the battle and compel the Ukrainians to withdraw.
The Center for Defense Strategies highlighted one of the major risks. “The resupply of the advanced units of the enemy’s 30th Motor Rifle Brigade, which has broken through in Ocheretyne, is effectively blocked by the Ukrainian defense forces, who maintain complete fire control over this route.”
In penetrating five miles into Ukrainian territory, the most westerly Russian troops are essentially alone and far removed from their main supply lines. They’re vulnerable. If Ukrainian troops can starve them before Russian reinforcements widen the salient and stiffen their logistics, the Russian may yet lose this fight.
That’s the optimistic outcome for the outnumbered, outgunned Ukrainian brigades around Ocheretyne. The realistic outcome is that they attempt a fighting retreat to the west.
But the Ukrainians are desperate to avoid retreating. It’s just too risky.
Sources:
1. Center for Defense Strategies: https://cdsdailybrief.substack.com/p/russias-war-on-ukraine-250424; https://cdsdailybrief.substack.com/p/russias-war-on-ukraine-250424
2. Ukraine Control Map: https://www.google.com/maps/d/viewer?mid=180u1IkUjtjpdJWnIC0AxTKSiqK4G6Pez&hl=en_US&ll=48.203251744836834%2C37.60548925433536&z=12
3. Andrew O. G. Young: https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/Research%20and%20Books/2023/ArmiesRetrt-HeckMills-2023.pdf
