China’s People’s Liberation Army-Navy (PLA-N) is now building the Type 076 amphibious assault ship, a vessel that could play a pivotal role in any conflict with the United States over Taiwan.
Late last month, The Warzone reported the warship may be capable of supporting uncrewed combat air vehicles (UCAVs) and other fixed-wing drones while also carrying aircraft and assault forces.
Built at the Hudong-Zhonghua shipyard in Shanghai, the vessel marks a significant step forward in China’s naval architecture by bridging the gap between the country’s largest amphibious warship, the Type 075, and its most advanced aircraft carrier, the Fujian.
The Type 076 is approximately 864 feet long and 141 feet wide, with a broader flight deck than its predecessors. It may also feature electromagnetic catapults and arresting gear, suggesting a focus on a drone-centric naval strategy.
The Type 076 aligns with the PLA-N’s efforts to enhance its maritime strike capabilities, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) operations, and traditional amphibious assaults. The ship’s construction began around October 2023, underscoring China’s robust shipbuilding capacity and ambition to project naval power beyond its shores.
The Warzone report states that the Type 076 indicates China’s commitment to maintaining a formidable presence in contested regions such as the South China Sea and potentially during scenarios involving Taiwan.
China still faces significant capability gaps in its sealift capabilities, which may be insufficient for a cross-strait invasion of Taiwan. The construction of the Type 076 is apparently part of its efforts to address those shortcomings.
In October 2023, Asia Times noted that the PLA-N’s amphibious assault ships could transport approximately the equipment equivalent of one heavy brigade and 21,000 troops during an initial invasion landing on Taiwan.
However, Taiwan would have some 1,200 tanks waiting, more than the PLA’s capability to conduct a single, coordinated amphibious landing with fewer than half that number.
The PLA may plan to deploy 300,000 to 400,000 troops to quickly capture Taiwan after a decapitation strike, which would aim to eliminate Taiwan’s civilian and military leadership.
But if Taiwan’s leadership survives the initial strike and can mobilize its military and civilian population, the PLA might need to send upward of 2 million troops to Taiwan, including police and paramilitary personnel, to ensure a three-to-one or five-to-one numerical advantage over Taiwan’s defending forces.
While China may repurpose civilian ferries to compensate for its sealift capability gaps, that approach would face significant challenges as the survivability of civilian ferries against attack and the institutional capacity of China’s merchant marine to adopt a wartime posture.
Amid ongoing debates about the usefulness of aircraft carriers in future conflicts given their increasing vulnerabilities to sophisticated ISR and anti-ship weapons, China may consider a drone carrier concept in its Type 076 amphibious assault ship.
In May 2024, Asia Times noted that drone carriers provide similar power projection benefits as traditional aircraft carriers by enabling unmanned aerial operations at extended distances beyond their borders, expanding their tactical, operational and strategic possibilities.
Unmanned systems offer a safer and more economical option than manned aircraft, making them appropriate for risky missions like ISR and light attack operations on land and at sea. Drone carriers provide a cost-efficient and feasible solution for middle-income countries to expand their airpower capabilities across great distances without needing land bases.
States may enhance their unmanned aerial capabilities in low-intensity conflict areas to support allies and weaken adversaries with limited air defenses. However, drone carriers will not be a game-changer in military affairs until unmanned aircraft can achieve air superiority. Drones face significant limitations in environments with strong air defense systems and electronic warfare capabilities.
In a Taiwan conflict, China likely plans to use drone swarms from land and sea to overwhelm the island’s air defenses. This strategy would be a preliminary step to more extensive air and missile attacks, ultimately leading to a potential amphibious assault.
China may experiment with the “lightning carrier” concept to disperse naval aviation capability over more ships instead of concentrating on a few large and potentially vulnerable supercarriers.
In December 2023, Asia Times noted that lightning carriers can carry about 20 fighter jets, fewer than the 50 jets on supercarriers. These light carriers are designed to be more adaptable and economical.
As a light carrier, the Type 076 may have significant operational flexibility. Its deck may house drones or the FC-31 stealth fighter, while it can also operate rotary-wing aircraft and deploy troops ashore in an invasion of Taiwan.
Moreover, China’s massive shipbuilding capacity may lend itself to building more of these ships, which can disperse capability over several such vessels, thereby increasing survivability.
However, in February 2024, the South China Morning Post (SCMP) noted that the FC-31 stealth fighter, China’s take on the US F-35, is not yet in PLA service.
In comparing the two aircraft, SCMP says the F-35 may have a lower top speed than the FC-31, reaching Mach 1.6 compared to the FC-31’s Mach 1.8, but the F-35 is believed to have a greater combat range of 1,240 kilometers compared to the FC-31’s 1,207 kilometers.
As for the ground element of the PLA’s amphibious assault forces, Asia Times noted in January 2024 that China has been steadily improving the quality and quantity of the PLA Marine Corps (PLA-MC), expanding its size from two to eight combined arms brigades.
While the PLA-MC would be crucial in a potential attack on Taiwan, it would serve as a support force rather than the primary invading one, as the PLA Ground Force (PLA-GF) has specialized amphibious assault units for such a mission.
The PLA-MC can offer six battalions to support an invasion but its compact size and limited experience in expeditionary missions constrict it.
However, China’s emerging light carrier and carrier fleet faces many tactical and operational challenges stemming from their tiny air wings, vulnerability to enemy forces and limited value compared to land-based airfields.
The tiny air wings of China’s light carriers also pose an “offense-defense” dilemma. Sending more aircraft to an attack may leave the fleet vulnerable to a retaliatory air attack but committing more aircraft to fleet air defense reduces attack power.
China’s light carriers are also as vulnerable as their larger counterparts to US and allied anti-ship missiles, submarines and aircraft.
Such limitations may also limit the strategic value of these light carriers compared to land-based airfields with far more capacity, defensibility and survivability, although their static positions limit the operational range of China’s combat aircraft.
However, China’s naval and air bases in Hainan, the South China Sea and perhaps a recently upgraded base in its ally Cambodia may compensate for the capability gaps of its light carrier fleet.
