Europe doubles down on protracted war in Ukraine

To highlight the Patriots’ isolation, the main center-right group, the EPP, counterattacked by introducing a resolution on Ukraine. They were joined by other centrists — socialists, liberals, Greens — and the pro-Ukraine right from the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) group, the assembly’s fourth largest. The five political groups tabled a conventionally hardline joint text, demanding, among other things, the removal of any restrictions on the use of Western weapons systems delivered to Ukraine against military targets on Russian territory.

The lawmakers also “reiterated their belief that Ukraine is on an irreversible path to NATO” even though the European Parliament has no say over NATO and a number of the EU members (Austria, Ireland, Malta and Cyprus) are not members of NATO and have not shown, to date, any inclination to join it.

Reflecting the Brussels meltdown over Viktor Orban’s diplomacy that took him in recent weeks to Kyiv, Moscow, Beijing, Washington, and Trump’s Mar-a-Lago in what he called a “peace mission,” the resolution made a point of condemning him for “violating common EU positions” and failing to coordinate with other member states and EU institutions.

Lawmakers demanded “repercussions for Hungary.” While these repercussions are already being set in motion by attempts to boycott Hungary’s rotating EU presidency, no interest has been shown in engaging with the substance of Orban’s comments which he articulated in a letter to the president of the EU Council Charles Michel.

Given the degree to which Orban chose to highlight what, to be meaningful, should have been a highly sensitive and discreet diplomatic initiative, there may be reasonable doubts about its effectiveness. The problem, however, is that he is the only EU leader left who enjoys open channels of communications with the Kremlin, while the mainstream, “respectable” European leaders mostly trade in maximalist rhetoric about Ukrainian victory and Russian defeat without defining those terms, much less offering credible paths to their achievement.

The Patriots for Europe tabled an alternative motion on Ukraine that was substantially different from the majority’s resolution. While they condemned Russia’s aggression and expressed support for Ukraine’s independence and territorial integrity within its internationally recognized borders (i.e. including Donbass and Crimea), they also recalled that every member state “is sovereign regarding its decisions on providing financial, military and diplomatic support to third countries.”

They also stressed their conviction that there is no military solution to the conflict and that peace is the only viable and sustainable solution. Accordingly, they urged that the parties “open diplomatic channels, with the aim of concluding a lasting peace agreement.”

The two motions exposed the unbridgeable differences in the two sides’ approach to the war in Ukraine; thus, negotiations to find a compromise proved neither possible nor desired. Rather, political points were to be scored: the majority sought to portray the Patriots as Russian President Vladimir Putin’s stooges, while the Patriots accused the majority of escalating the conflict in pursuit of unachievable goals and weakening European economies in the process.

As anticipated, the majority text was adopted overwhelmingly: 495 votes to 137. Amendments tabled by the Left group, designed to open the way for a diplomatic solution to the hostilities, were all rejected. This is telling: while it may have been politically unpalatable for the centrists to vote for the Patriots’ proposals, no such unofficial restrictions exist regarding the far left; thus, the rejection of diplomacy seems to be a matter of choice, not just political convenience.

The “centrist” majority also rejected the Left’s (relatively moderate) amendment that deplored the apparent double standards applied by the EU to violations of international law by Russia in Ukraine and by Israel in Gaza.

While the leaders of the majority factions congratulated themselves on sending another “strong message” to Orban, not all of the lawmakers appear convinced. Michael von Schulenberg, a parliamentarian from Sahra Vagenknecht’s left leaning party in Germany and a veteran U.N. diplomat, deplored that the majority’s draft was based on “continuing and intensifying the war up to a military victory over Russia, which is now completely unrealistic.” The rejection of attempts at finding a peaceful solution, in his view, will continue inflicting “immeasurable suffering on the Ukrainian people.”

As a recent survey from the European Council on Foreign Relations showed, such views are fairly widespread among Europeans, including the voters of the mainstream political parties. However, as the initial session of the new European Parliament has demonstrated, they are destined to remain isolated in an assembly that is supposed to represent them.

Roughly the same coalition (except the majority of the ECR and some defections on the center-right, like the French Gaullists) that voted for the resolution on Ukraine also elected von der Leyen, a Russia hawk, for a second term. Add to this the designation of the former Estonian prime-minister Kaja Kallas, who once advocated for dismembering Russia, as the EU’s high representative for foreign policy, and the alignment of EU institutions in favor of continuity on Ukraine becomes complete.

These dynamics in the EU, however, can change if a possible Trump-Vance administration brings about a dreaded (or hoped for, depending on one’s perspective) American retrenchment from Europe. In that case, the Europeans will either have to fight Russia in Ukraine with substantially less U.S. support or seriously consider how a negotiated end to the war can be achieved.