On August 29, Ukraine launched its most massive drone attack on Russian territory to date, including an attack on Pskov airfield near the Estonian border where at least two and perhaps as many as four Il-76 jet transport aircraft were destroyed.
The Il-76 is a large multi-purpose, fixed-wing, four-engine turbofan strategic airlifter that also can be configured for special missions. It is a workhorse of the Russian Air Force used to transport troops and supplies.
These aircraft have been produced since 1971 and are still manufactured. The Il-76 is also operated by civilian organizations in Russia and abroad. The aircraft in various versions has been sold to more than a dozen foreign operators.
The significance of the attack on Pskov is the location of the airfield in northwestern Russia. It is 38.1 miles (61.3 kilometers) from an Estonian border post Luhamaa. Pskov is some 500 miles (800 km) from Ukrainian territory, which has raised serious questions about where the drone or drones were launched from in the attack.
For drones to operate at long range, they need special communications capabilities. US drones including the RQ-4 Global Hawk, the RQ-1/MQ-1 Reaper and the RQ-170 Sentinel use satellite communications and radio relays.
Drones such as the Reaper carry air-to-ground missiles and are equipped with very sophisticated radars and electro-optical gear. Ukraine does not knowingly have drones like these.
The Russians think that the drone launched on Pskov came either from a clandestine launch on Russian or Belarusian territory or from Estonia. There have been other attacks deep in Russian territory that suggest drones were smuggled into Russia, even close to Moscow.
The Ukrainians have also carried out sabotage operations on Russian territory, often involving Russian citizens, just as they also have done in Russian-occupied territory in Ukraine.
The Russian press provides almost no information about attacks inside Russia unless they catch the perpetrators, which occasionally happens. However, social media outlets do provide photos and videos of locations in Russia that have been hit.
Some sabotage is aimed at military targets, but there are plenty of targets such as office buildings, shopping malls and warehouses. Internal security in Russia seems incapable of stopping or even reducing the frequency of sabotage operations.
Drone attacks and sabotage are not going to significantly change the trajectory of the war on Ukrainian territory. Instead, it seems the Ukrainian objective is to sow discord in Russia by demonstrating that Russia’s defenses are porous and that authorities in Russia are not capable of protecting key assets inside the country.
In addition, Ukraine wants to demonstrate that there is serious opposition to President Vladimir Putin’s government, thus the use of Russian citizens for provocations.
Ukraine’s attacks on Russia also are intended as a quid pro quo for Russian attacks on Ukraine’s civilian infrastructure. Just as the Ukrainians launched their heaviest drone attack on Russia on August 29, the Russians carried out a heavy bombardment of Kiev.
In Ukraine’s drone and sabotage operations there are a number of risks that may concern Ukraine’s NATO partners. A strike near a vulnerable NATO country, such as the Pskov attack, could trigger a cross-border response that could spark a bigger conflict involving NATO.
Russia took a big risk when it recently hit Ukraine’s Izmail (Izmayil) grain depot and port on the Danube. Romania is just across the river.
The Russians will no doubt step up their efforts to improve domestic security and add additional defensive systems to deal with drone attacks.
However, Ukraine has to be careful in its choice of targets inside Russia. In particular, Ukraine has to stay away from installations where nuclear weapons are stored or where Russian strategic aircraft are located.
And it must be careful about attacks Russia may interpret as coming directly from NATO members. A mistake could instantly transform the Ukraine war into a NATO-wide war, something NATO is unprepared to handle.
Stephen Bryen is a senior fellow at the Center for Security Policy and the Yorktown Institute. A version of this article was originally published on Weapons and Strategy, his Substack. Asia Times is republishing the article with permission.
